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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
court whether the divorce or other principal litigation was ini-
tiated there or not. It is assumed that these matters will be cured
by amendments to be proposed at the next session of the Legis-
lature.
LABOR LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
Last year, in the course of reviewing the court's invalidation
of the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act at the 1953-1954 term, the
writer voiced concern that the decision foreshadowed a return
to the era of the labor injunction.1 The record of the 1954-1955
term plainly demonstrates that this apprehension was no idle
speculation. Three labor cases were decided by the court during
the term, each of which held that union picketing for recognition
should be enjoined. The cases arose in a variety of factual and
legal contexts and hence will be discussed individually.
Taking the cases in their chronological order, the first was
Godchaux Sugars v. Chaisson.2 In this case the union was al-
leged to have picketed the plantation as well as the refineries and
mills of the employers at the cane harvesting season for the pur-
pose of compelling the employers to recognize the union as the
collective bargaining agent for the agricultural employees work-
ing on the plantations. It was further alleged that the picketing
was accompanied by violence which threatened the safety of per-
sons and property. No evidence was taken on this issue, counsel
for the union conceding "for the purpose of saving time, that if
a restraining order were to issue it should cover violence and
harm to person and property. ' '8 The Supreme Court construed
this concession as "an admission that violence and tortious acts
have, in fact, occurred during the course of this dispute, ' 4 and
sustained the issuance of the injunction against all picketing on
the authority of the Douglas Public Service decision of the prior
term.5 This poses an apparent non sequitur, as the concession
was made for the point of limiting the injunction, but was taken
as an admission for the broader purpose of enjoining all picket-
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The case was Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74
So.2d 182 (1954), discussed in 'The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1958-1954 Term - Labor Law, 15 LouiSIANA LAw Rvimv 324 (1955).
2. 227 La. 146, 78 So.2d 673 (1955).
3. Id. at 165, 78 So.2d at 679.
4. Id. at 165, 78 So.2d at 680.
5. Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So.2d 182 (1954).
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ing - both violent and peaceful. The court itself seemed to have
entertained some doubts on the score, for in a later portion of
the opinion the issue is more broadly stated, as follows:
"But we think the question posed here is of such importance
that we may concede, for the sake of argument, that the man-
ner of picketing was legal. This focuses for our decision the
very vital question remaining for decision, that is, whether
the state's public policy permits the assertion of the right to
organize and to picket for recognition at the expense of the
economy of the state, and at the risk of entirely destroying
or wiping out one of the state's principal industries." 6
The question, stated thus broadly, was unquestionably answered
correctly by the court when it replied in the negative. In a long
series of decisions beginning in 1942T the Supreme Court of the
United States has made it clear that even peaceful picketing may
be enjoined when it threatens obstruction of the public policy of
a state.
But one need not quarrel with the principle of the decision
to find a basis for disagreeing with its application to the facts
of the Godchaux Sugars case. On the basis of the figures relied
upon by the court, only 10.5 percent of the sugar cane crop was
affected by the strike.8 It would seem debatable whether the loss
of this fraction of the crop actually threatened to wipe out the
industry. But it is even more debatable whether sugar cane pro-
duction is in fact "one of the state's principal industries." A
study of the Louisiana economy recently completed by the College
of Commerce of Louisiana State University shows: (1) that
Louisiana's entire agricultural industry accounts for less than
ten percent of the total income of the state,9 and (2) only four-
teen percent of all agricultural income consists of receipts from
sugar cane.10 Citation of these figures is not for the purpose of
evaluating the policy which the court adopted in Godchaux Sug-
ars, or to take sides in the controversy which it embraced. The
6. 227 La. 146, 169, 78 So.2d 679, 681 (1955).
7. Carpenters Union, AFL v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) ; Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) ; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339
U.S. 460 (1950) ; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S.
470 (1950) ; Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
8. "In 1953 some 5,758,846.9 tons of cane grown in this state were processed
into sugar and some 67,872.4 tons were marketed for syrup .... In the Parish of
Lafourche, where this case arose, . . . the planted acreage in that parish yielded
609,936.5 tons." 227 La. 146, 157, 78 So.2d 673, 676 (1955).
9. Batighn, The Changing Structure of the Louisiana Economy, 16 LoUiSIANA
BusiNEss BULLETIN 11 (1954).
10. Id. at 17.
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purpose is rather to focus attention upon two other points. The
first of these is that Louisiana's labor law is no longer subject
to legislative control in this vitally important area. The God-
chaux decision, foreshadowed by Douglas Public Service, marks
a return to the era of the labor injunction and because of the sub-
stantial influence of injunctions upon the varied activities of
unions, it necessarily means that much of Louisiana's labor law
will be judge-made. And judge-made policy may differ radically
from legislatively declared policy as it did in the Douglas Public
Service case. The second point is simply this: Policy making in
this field of law necessarily involves economic considerations of
broad scope, considerations which judges, by training, experi-
ence, and function, are not specially qualified to resolve." This
is not to say that legislators are always well qualified in this
vital field either, but the legislative process seems far better
adapted to cope with the problems of labor-management rela-
tions. It is to be recognized, of course, that it will require a con-
stitutional amendment to place the labor law policy-making func-
tion in the hands of the legislature so long as the decision in
Douglas Public Service stands.
12
The Godchaux case involved no problem of conflict with fed-
eral labor policy because the employees in that case were agri-
cultural workers, specifically excluded from the protection of
the Labor Management Relations Act by the terms of section
2 (2). But in the second case to come before the Louisiana court
during the past term, Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 3 this perplexing problem of federalism in labor rela-
tions was a significant issue. In this case the activities of the
employer as well as the employees were of a nature which placed
the employment relationship within the general coverage of the
federal act. The union confronted the management of the com-
pany with a demand for recognition, asserting that 174 of the
plant's 225 employees had authorized the union to represent
11. "It thus is widely held that the judiciary generally is not familiar with
the labor law, the particular problems involved in the management-worker and
management-union relations, and with the specific needs of employers and work-
ers. Hence, it is regarded as ill equipped to handle labor issues with the required
special legal, economic, and social expertness." BRAUN, LABOR DISPUTES AND
TnEIR SETTLEMENT 303 (1955).
12. On November 21, 1955, the United States Supreme Court granted the
union's petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated the Louisiana court's judg-
ment on the ground of mootness, remanding the case for appropriate proceed-
ings. sub nom. Chaisson v. Southcoast Corp., 76 Sup. Ct. 184 (1955).
13. 227 La. 1109, 81 So.2d 413 (1955).
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them. Relying upon the fact that the union had not complied
with the non-Communist affidavit provisions of section 9(h)
of the federal act and was thus barred from invoking the reme-
dies of the National Labor Relations Board in representation as
well as unfair labor practice proceedings, the company's assistant
manager advised it "that inasmuch as the Union was not recog-
nized by the National Labor Relations Board, he would not recog-
nize it.' 14 Thereupon the union called a strike and established a
picket line at the plant "with the result that the employer's op-
erations were greatly curtailed and irreparable loss was sus-
tained." 15 The picketing was apparently wholly peaceful, but the
trial court issued an injunction.
On appeal to the Supreme Court the union raised three objec-
tions to the injunction order. Two of the three grounds urged
on appeal dealt with issues of state law,' while the third raised
the federal question relating to the jurisdiction of state courts
in the context of this case. Although it would appear that there
might have been more to the union's contentions based upon the
state law grounds than the court accorded them, the more sig-
nificant aspect of the case is the disposition of the federal
question.
The union's specification of error reads as follows:
"The Court was in error in rendering injunction based
upon unfair labor practice where the business involved af-
fected interstate commerce."
Principal reliance for this proposition, of course, was predicated
upon the Garner case,' 7 holding that the jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board to hear and restrain unfair labor
practices is exclusive and preempts state courts in the exercise
of their jurisdiction over peaceful picketing. The court dis-
tinguished the Garner decision, using language as follows:
14. Id. at 1115, 81 So.2d at 415.
15. Ibid.
16. The suability of unions and the applicability of the "concerted activities"
language of the Louisiana Labor Mediation Board Act, LA. R.S. 23:876 (1950),
and of the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act, LA. R.S. 23:822 (1950), which were not
before the court in the Douglas Public Service case. The majority of the court
treated both of these issues as being foreclosed by the prior decisions in the God.
chaux Sugars and Douglas Public Service Corp. cases, respectively. Justice Haw.
thorne dissented from that portion of the opinion dealing with the method ol
citing unions and concurred on the issue involving the anti-injunction statute with
the same reluctance which he expressed in the Godchaum Sugars case, having
originally dissented from the court's decision in Douglas Public Service Corp.
17. Garner v. Teamster Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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"However, the labor activity sought to be restrained in
the Garner case was peaceful stranger picketing for the pur-
pose of coercing the employer to compel his employees to join
a union- an activity, as demonstrated in the opinion, spe-
cifically denounced as an unfair labor practice in the Act. In
the instant case the picketing was engaged in for the sole
purpose of compelling the employer to recognize as the legally
constituted agent of its employees a union that has no legal
status before the National Labor Relations Board because of
its failure and refusal to comply with the provisions of the
Act requiring the filing of certain information relative to
structural and financial matters, as well as non-communist
oaths. This is clearly not an act denounced as an unfair la-
bor practice by the amendment of 1947."'
It is somewhat debatable whether this distinction is a valid one.19
18. 227 La. 1109, 1120, 81 So.2d 415, 417 (1955).
19. Whether the distinction drawn and the conclusions reached are correct,
would seem to turn upon the allegations of the employer's petition, for in the
Garner case it was said, "On the basis of the allegations, the petitioners could
have presented this grievance to the National Labor Relations Board. The re-
spondents were subject to being summoned before that body to justify their con-
duct. We think the grievance was not subject to litigation in the tribunals of the
State." 346 U.S. 485, 501 (1953). The writer has not had access to the record
in the instant case, and the court's opinion does not set forth the allegations of
the petition. In the union's brief in the Supreme Court, however, the statement
is made (at p. 27) that "In paragraph 10 of its petition the plaintiff alleged
the picket line was unlawful, as its purpose was to compel the employer to deal
with Union as the bargaining agent in absence of the employees' selection of
said Union as their representative." Taking this language on its face, there is
a literal difficulty in reaching the conclusion, urged by the union, that it amounts
to an allegation of an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8(b) (2) of
the federal act. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1952). That section forbids a union "to cause or attempt to cause an
employed to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3)"
which, in turn, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization." The employer's allegation that it was the
union's "purpose to compel the employer to deal with Union as the bargaining
agent in absence of the employees' selection of said Union as their representative,"
is not a literal charge that discrimination against employees would follow as a
matter of course. This is at least left to implication. Nothing of this nature
was left to implication in Garner, for there it was observed that "the courts below
found that respondents' purpose in picketing was to coerce petitioners into com-
pelling or influencing their employees to join the union," 346 U.S. 485, 487
(1953) and later it was said, "Congress has taken in hand this particular type
of controversy where it affects interstate commerce. In language almost identical
to parts of the Pennsylvania statute, it has forbidden labor unions to exert
certain types of coercion on employees through the medium of the employer." Id.
at 488-89. To be sure, if the facts alleged were true (as they apparently were
not), the employer's recognition of the union lacking majority support would
violate the fundamental purpose of the act-and specifically would constitute
an employer unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (2) -but it does not fall literally
within the proscription of § 8(a) (3) and hence not within § 8(b) (2) either. Nor
is this to say that the National Labor Relations Board would not find the par-
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Assuming, however, that the Louisiana court was correct in
concluding that the conduct attributed to the union was not an
unfair labor practice, it does not follow that state jurisdiction
exists to enjoin it. If in fact the union's picketing was not an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of the federal act, it
would seem very clearly to be one of the "concerted activities"
which "employees shall have the right.., to engage in" pursuant
to the policy declared by section 7 of the federal act. The uni-
form national policy sought to be achieved by the congressional
enactment may be just as effectively frustrated by state court
orders which restrain the exercise of rights conferred as by those
which seek to restrain the wrongs prohibited by the federal act.
This principle was clearly and cogently expressed by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his opinion for a unanimous Court in Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,20 last March reversing an injunction order
against union picketing which had been issued by the courts of
Missouri. In the course of his opinion it was said "even if it
were clear that no unfair labor practices were involved, it would
not necessarily follow that the State was free to issue its injunc-
tion. If this conduct does not fall within the prohibitions of sec-
tion 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, it may fall within the protection
of section 7, as concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid
or protection. '2 1
The union's noncompliance with the non-Communist affidavit
provisions of section 9 (h) of the federal act has no bearing upon
the problem. The consequences of such noncompliance are ex-
plicitly set forth in that section and consist simply of the denial
of the Board's remedial procedures in representation and unfair
labor practice cases; there is no withdrawal of the rights de-
ticular activity set forth in the allegation to be a violation of § 8(b) (2). The
Board might well be 'willing to make the implication suggested. This is one of the
principal difficulties which led the Supreme Court of the United States to adopt
the Garner principle. It pointed out that "it is not necessary or appropriate for
us to surmise how the National Labor Relations Board might have decided this
controversy had the petitioners presented it to that body .. . .Congress evidently
considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was
necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid those
diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and
attitudes toward labor controversies. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a di-
versity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudi-
cation as are different rules of substantive law." Id. at 489, 490-91. Viewed in
this light, it was for the Board, not the state courts of Louisiana to resolve the
question whether the allegations of the employer's petition charged the commis-
sion of an unfair labor practice.
20. 75 Sup. Ct. 480 (1955).
21. Id. at 487.
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clared in section 7. An expansion of the sanctions of section
9(h) to effect such a withdrawal would ignore the plain lan-
guage of the act and constitute judicial legislation in its grossest
form.
It is even more obvious, of course, that collective bargaining
by noncomplying unions is not prohibited by the federal act. It
is common knowledge that the United Mine Workers, the union
involved in this case, has continued to maintain the collective
bargaining relationships which it enjoyed with employers prior
to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, and has expanded those
relationships in the course of its organizational activities. Sim-
ilar activities have been conducted by other noncomplying unions.
It has never been suggested that this widely publicized activity
constituted a violation of the federal act, for the obvious reason
that it is not. Nevertheless the Louisiana court denominated the
union's efforts to obtain recognition in this case as an "unlaw-
ful objective." After concluding that the picketing was not an
unfair labor practice under the federal act (which is seriously
debatable as indicated in footnote 19) and pointing out that the
union could not obtain certification from the Board pursuant to
representation proceedings either upon its own petition or that
of the employer, the court said:
"The plaintiff's refusal to recognize the Union was, there-
fore, not in violation of any obligation imposed by law, and
the picketing in furtherance of ths unlawful objective was
the employment of economic pressure illegally for the purpose
of causing the employer irreparable injury for which it has
no adequate administrative or legal remedy- injurious con-
duct which the state has jurisdiction to relieve." (Emphasis
added.) 22
As already indicated, the union's efforts to achieve recog-
nition was not an "illegal objective" within the terms of the fed-
eral act. If, on the other hand, the court meant to imply that the
conduct involved here was in pursuit of an "illegal objective"
under state law, two difficulties are presented. In the first place,
the court did not say that the objective's illegality stemmed from
state law, nor did it cite any state policy, legislative or judicial,
which had been offended by the union's action. In the second
place, and assuming that the decision itself constitutes a judicial-
22. 227 La. 1109, 1132, 81 So.2d 413, 421 (1955).
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ly declared policy of the state to the effect that picketing by a
non-complying union is illegal, we are once again confronted with
the question whether the state may constitutionally forbid such
conduct in an interstate commerce setting when Congress, pur-
suant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, has adopted
a contrary policy, declaring that employees shall have the right
to engage in such activities. The dictum in Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., quoted above, suggests that it may not, and there are
three decisions of the Court antedating Garner which so hold.23
Unless the case is to be classified with those in which the United
States Supreme Court has held that the power exerted by the
state was not preempted by Congress, 24 the decision seems to be
plainly wrong.
An answer to this question will soon be forthcoming for the
United States Supreme Court granted the union's petition for a
writ of certiorari on October 17, 1955, and invited the Solicitor
General to file a brief amicus curiae setting forth the views of
the National Labor Relations Board.
25
The third and final labor case decided by the court during the
term was Piegts v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,2 6 which involved
the controversial Right to Work Act,27 and the result very prob-
ably exceeds the expectations of the sponsors of that legislation.
The employer, owner of a retail meat market, sought an injunc-
tion to restrain'recognition picketing of his establishment. No
federal issue was presented. The facts as they appear in the
opinion were simply these:
"Relator had two meat cutters in his employ, both of
whom were members of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
23. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), invalidating a Florida statute im-
posing restrictions upon the right of employees to designate a bargaining agent
which were inconsistent with the unqualified right conferred by the federal act;
International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950), invalidating strike-vote
provisions of Michigan legislation found to conflict with the rights conferred by
section 7 of the federal act, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952) ; and Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Rail-
way & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 383 (1951),
invalidating Wisconsin's compulsory arbitration legislation in public utility em-
ployments, similarly found to conflict with the right of employees to engage in
concerted action to enforce union demands.
24. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin, 315 U.S. 740 (1942); International
Union v. Wisconsin, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ; Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v.
Wisconsin, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) ; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Con-
struction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
25. 76 Sup. Ct. 102 (1955).
26. 228 La. 131, 81 So.2d 835 (1955), 16 LOUISIANA LAW REvimW 187.
27. LA. R.S. 23:881 et seq. (1950).
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Butchers Workmen of North America, Local Union No. 437,
AFL of.New Orleans and Vicinity, Louisiana. The union pre-
sented relator with an agreement, which he refused to sign
because of the following clause:
"'The employer shall recognize the union as the sole bar-
gaining agent for all the employer's employees in the meat
departments, poultry and fish which have to do with
wages, hours of labor, and working conditions, excluding
all supervisors as defined in the labor management rela-
tions act of 1947, as amended.'
"Upon relator's refusal to negotiate a union contract with
the defenddnt union and its officers and members, his two
neat cutters went on strike and commenced picketing his
establishment on February 7, 1955. Relator, thereupon, em-
ployed a non-union butcher." (Emphasis by the court.) 28
The employer contended that the union's request to be recog-
nized as the sole bargaining agent for all the employees violated
the act and for this reason asked that the picketing be enjoined.
The union denied this, relying first upon the fact that it had not
requested a closed shop, union shop or any other form of com-
pulsory unionism provision in the proposed contract, and second
upon the right of employees to engage in collective bargaining,
expressly saved by section 10 of the act which reads as follows:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to deny or
abridge the right of employees by and through a labor organiza-
tion or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer."
The court, dividing five to two, sustained the employer's conten-
tion upon the basis of the following syllogism:
MAJOR PREMISE - Section 1 of the act provides: "That it is
hereby declared to be the public policy of Louisiana that the
right of a person or persons to work shall not be denied or
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in
any labor union or labor organization." (Emphasis added.)
MINOR PREMISE - Webster's Dictionary declares that the
term "abridged" means "diminished, reduced, curtailed, or
shortened."
CONCLUSION - A non-union man's rights would be dimin-
ished, reduced, curtailed, or shortened if a union acted as his
28. 81 So.2d 835, 836 (La. 1955).
302 [Vol. XVI
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agent because the union might insist upon higher wages or
shorter hours than the non-union man might be willing to
accept in order to remain gainfully employed; hence it was
a violation of the act for the union to seek recognition as the
sole bargaining agent for the plaintiff's employees.
It is not unlikely that many observers, like the writer, experi-
enced the legal equivalent of the proverbial "double take," upon
first reading the majority opinion in the case. Most persons
familiar with the legislation, including many of its proponents,
would unquestionably agree that the result reached here was not
within the intendment of the statute.29 The conclusion is fan-
tastic, but the reasoning of the court has a superficial plausibility
that appears to sustain it.
It may be conceded that a non-union man might be willing
to accept lower wages or longer hours than the union might de-
mand in order to remain gainfully employed. Indeed, this fre-
quently happens to union members themselves. Whenever the
time comes to negotiate or renew a contract with an employer,
the union is confronted with the necessity of selecting from
among competing items the particular issue or issues on which
it will frame its demands. Some members may feel that efforts
should be concentrated upon obtaining a substantial wage in-
crease, others may prefer adjustments in vacation, pension or
insurance benefits, while still others may wish to press for
changes in the seniority or other provisions of the contract.
Somehow these preliminary matters must be determined before
the union's negotiating team meets with management to bargain
the new contract. If the union's affairs are conducted according
to democratic ideals, these issues may be debated and voted upon
29. Mr. Paul G. Borron, Jr., who participated in the drafting of the statute
and testified for the proponents when the bill was pending in the Legislature,
subsequently wrote The Case for the Right to Work Act, 15 LOuIsIANA LAW
REviEw 66 (1954). In the course of his article Mr. Borron discounted the fears
expressed by many persons that the act "will destroy collective bargaining, will
interfere with an employee's right to join a labor union or participate in union
activities, will permit employer discrimination against unions" and others by
saying that, "A mere reading of the act discloses it does nothing more than pro-
hibit the evils of compulsory unionism and union monopoly, and does not impair
or affect the many legitimate practices of organized labor to achieve its objec-
tives. ...
"The power of unions will not be affected. Any particular union which through
proper and intelligent leadership and effective collective bargaining has won the
support of the employees it represents will not be affected by the act."
It is to be noted that the power of this union was certainly and adversely
affected despite the fact that it had the unanimous support of the employees it
sought to represent in this case.
1956]
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in an open union meeting; in other types of unions, the issues
may be resolved by less democratic methods; but the significant
fact is that, however decided, there will almost inevitably be a
dissatisfied minority of members who would have preferred that
the negotiations embrace other issues which have been suggested
and rejected. So long as the issues which are selected bear a
reasonable relation to the subject of wages, hours and working
conditions, and do not involve hostile discrimination against
the dissentient minority (or non-members) the bargaining agent
will be held to have discharged its responsibility.
3 0
Viewed in this light, there is an appeal to reason in that part
of the majority's conclusion that a non-union man's rights are
abridged when the union, acting as his agent, determines to press
demands that he might have relinquished, or vice versa. It is to
be observed, however, that a similar abridgement of the rights
of union members also occurs. But more importantly, it is sub-
mitted that this does not constitute a violation of the act for
either of two valid reasons: (1) The right abridged is not pro-
tected by the act, and (in the alternative) (2) the abridgement
is not on account of non-membership in a union.
The policy language of section 1 quoted by the majority in
its major premise clearly says that "the right ... to work shall
not be . . . abridged on account of membership or non-member-
ship in any labor union." It is not all rights, but merely the un-
qualified "right to work" which is protected; and furthermore,
even that right is not protected against abridgement on all ac-
counts, but solely against abridgement "on account of member-
ship or non-membership" in a union. When a union, acting as
agent for a non-union man, presses demands which he. might
relinquish, it does not abridge his unqualified "right to work"
(unless it demands his discharge, which was not the case here).
The right abridged in such a case is the non-union man's right
to work on terms agreeable to himself- a right ignored by the
statute.
A second, and alternative, analysis likewise demonstrates the
fallacy of the majority's conclusion. For the purpose of this
analysis, it may be assumed that the right protected by the act is
the non-union man's right to work on terms agreeable to him-
self; or it may even be assumed that his unqualified right to
30. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
[Vol. XVI
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work has been abridged as a result of the employer's closing
down his establishment in the face of the union's demands.
Under either hypothesis, it may be assumed that the non-union
man's right to work has been abridged, but the fundamental
question to be resolved before concluding that there has been a
violation of the act is whether the abridgement is on account of
his non-membership in the union. It is submitted that the answer
to this question must be "No." Even conceding that the right
to work has been abridged in such a case, it is clearly evident
that the right is abridged with respect to all workers, both mem-
bers as well as non-members of the union. Under such circum-
stances it is obvious that to the extent that abridgement occurs,
it falls with an even hand on members and non-members alike
and cannot possibly be "on account of membership or non-mem-
bership in any labor union."
It is submitted that the majority's preoccupation with the
scope and meaning of the word "abridged" caused it to ignore
the qualifying language in the surrounding context. To hold that
"the right to work" means the right to work on terms acceptable
to himself is to add language where it was plainly not intended.
To hold that an abridgement which affects union members and
non-members alike violates a statute forbidding abridgement "on
account of membership or non-membership in any labor union"
is to disregard the plain language of the statute. It would be no
more illogical to hold that an employer violates the act when he
reduces wages or discharges employees because of declining busi-
ness. The employees in such a case have just as clearly suffered
an abridgement of their right to work on terms agreeable to
themselves as in the instant case. If it be argued that the
abridgement is not on account of membership or non-membership
in a labor union, the instant case should. be cited as holding that
such a showing is unnecessary.
One of the most distressing aspects of the case is the ma-
jority's failure to make any mention whatever of section 10
which purports to protect the right of employees to bargain col-
lectively. The effect of the decision, of course, is to read this
section out of the statute. For if unions (or other agents) may
not be designated as the exclusive agents to represent employees
in collective bargaining, there will be no collective bargaining.
It is this designation of an agent which "collectivizes" the bar-
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gaining process and distinguishes it from individual bargaining.
Furthermore, the Legislature must have presumed to have had
this concept in mind when it referred to collective bargaining in
section 10, for prior legislatures had used the term in other
enactments similarly stating the public policy of the state. When
it enacted the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1934 it made the
following declaration of public policy: "In dealing with (organ-
ized) employers the individual unorganized worker is helpless
to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom
of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions
of employment. Therefore, it is necessary that the individual
workman have full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to nego-
tiate the terms and conditions of his employment. . .. ,,3 The
intervening decision in Douglas Public Service, invalidating the
substantive provisions of the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not negate this policy, and certainly does not suggest that the
Legislature had a different concept in mind when it used the
expression "bargain collectively" in the Right to Work Act. In
1948 the Legislature created the Louisiana Labor Mediation
Board and again "declared as the public policy of this state that:
(1) Sound and stable industrial peace and the advancement of
the general welfare, health, and safety of this state and of the
best interests of employers and employees can most satisfactorily
be secured by the settlement of issues between employers and
employees through the processes of collective bargaining between
employers and the representatives of their employees" ;32 and
defined the term "representative of employees" to mean, among
other things, labor unions.
Against this background of legislative experience with the
term "collective bargaining," it is abundantly clear that when
the Legislature wrote section 10 into the Right to Work Act, it
intended that the institution of collective bargaining should
continue, subject only to the proviso that the parties might not
make contracts, or other agreements which force an employee to
join or refrain from joining a union. By omitting any reference
to this provision of the act, the majority has either (a) exhibited
a complete ignorance of the concept of collective bargaining and
31. LA. R.S. 23:822 (1950).
32. LA. R.S. 23:861 (1950).
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the Legislature's purpose in protecting it, or (b) has disregarded
it.
Two dissenting opinions were filed in the case. Justice Haw-
thorne stressed the point that a fair reading of the act makes it
clear "that its sole purpose is to prevent any person from being
forced to join a union or refrain from joining a union," and
argued that the absence of such factors from the case rendered
the act inapplicable. Justice Hamiter was of the opinion that
the union's action in this case was a permissible effort to "bar-
gain collectively" with the employer, specifically preserved by
section 10. He makes the point, which is well taken, that if there
was any abridgement of any right in this case it was the abridge-
ment by the employer of the right of his employees to bargain
collectively. It will be recalled that all of the plaintiff's em-
ployees wanted the union to represent them (both went on strike
when he refused their request to enter into the contract) but
their request, rather than being bargained collectively, encoun-
tered the fast one-two punch of (1) the employer's refusal, sub-
sequently reinforced by (2) the court's injunction order.
It is impossible to underestimate the importance of this case.
It is the first official decision of the court 3 to interpret and
apply the provisions of the act, and while the majority opinion
is confined to an interpretation and application of the language
found in the policy statement of section 1, it is of tremendous
significance for two reasons: first and most importantly because
it is so patently wrong, and second, because each of the ensuing
sections of the act spelling out substantive violations refers to
and prohibits any activity (in comprehensive prolixity) which
will "violate any provision of this act." Section 1 is obviously
a "provision of this act," and by its interpretation of that section
in this case, the court has determined the construction to be af-
forded each of these other sections.
Despite the fact that the public from time to time may have
occasion to criticize the activities of management or labor or
both, it is hardly conceivable that any substantial proportion of
our citizenry is ready to abandon the principle of collective bar-
gaining. But if, as held here, employees may not designate a
33. The Right to Work Act was also involved in Gulf Shipside Storage Corp.
v. Moore, 35 L.R.R.M. 2669 (March 21, 1955), but the case is still pending on
rehearing and has not been officially reported.
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union (or other agent) to serve as their exclusive agent for col-
lective bargaining, it follows, as previously stated, that there will
be no collective bargaining. There is one significant exception
to this generalization. Collective bargaining, as previously
understood and practiced, will very likely continue in those cases
where the relationship affects interstate commerce because of
the protection afforded by the federal act. Under the Garner
principle the right to designate a union as the exclusive agent
for collective bargaining will survive as one of the rights con-
ferred by section 7 of the federal act. Section 14 (b) of the fed-
eral act, impliedly authorizing the adoption of state right to
work acts, was not intended and presumably will not be con-
strued to permit the states to destroy the whole concept of col-
lective bargaining. With this exception and in intrastate situa-
tions, however, collective bargaining will survive only to the
extent that employers are willing to forego the use of the weapon
which the court has made available to them in the Piegts case.
Judging the future by the past it seems unlikely that we will
observe many instances of such admirable self restraint.
It is to be hoped, however, that the result will be changed by
either of the two avenues which suggest themselves. First, the
court itself, upon reflection may conclude that it has adopted a
construction of the act which was never intended by the Legisla-
ture and overrule the case. The second possibility is for the
Legislature to amend the act, specifically authorizing unions to
serve as the exclusive agents of employees for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining.
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A close and very interesting question was presented to the
Supreme Court by the twin cases of O'Keefe v. Burke.1 There,
plaintiff judicially challenged defendant's eligibility to be de-
clared the Democratic nominee for public office, on the ground
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 226 La. 1026, 78 So.2d 161 (1955) ; and 226 La. 1039, 78 So.2d 165 (1955).
On appeal in the second case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court overruling certain technical defenses of little importance, and finding
on the merits that defendant had not been a resident of Louisiana for the re-
quired minimum period.
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